ABSTRACT. This article is concerned with challenges to reforming the voting procedures of the Council of the European Union (EU). The next major waves of EU enlargement will cause the Union to increase to a membership of first twenty-one, and then twenty-six or possibly even more states. How does enlargement affect the Council's inherent "capacity to act" under the currently used qualified majority voting rule? It is demonstrated here that the expected increase in EU membership will most likely induce a larger "status quo bias" as compared to the present situation in the Council if the crucial majority decision quota is not lowered. In addition, the article is responding to some criticism that has been applied against assessing the leverage of EU governments in one of the EU's most important institutions: the Council of the EU. By resorting to techniques that capture the influence of a priori coalitions on the one hand and "connected coalitions" among EU governments on the other&mdash;applying nperson cooperative game theory&mdash;the piece illustrates how the assessment of relative voting leverage in the framework of weighted voting systems may be extended and applied to situations in which the specific distribution of members' preferences is known. These calculations are again relevant in the face of the upcoming rounds of EU enlargement and projects for institutional reform.
Introduction
The institutions of the European Union (EU) This article is concerned mainly with challenges that the Council faces. More specifically, it asks two broad questions with respect to concerns in the face of upcoming enlargement: (1) how does the present voting scheme used in the Council affect the relative influence of EU governments, especially under the assumption that members form certain a priori coalitions? And (2) Axelrod, 1970) Colomer and Hosli, 1999 (Putnam, 1988) , in which domestic policy preferences determine the intergovernmental bargaining behavior of EU members. Evidently, in this framework, changing domestic preferences may alter the formation of coalitions on the intergovernmental level (Moravcsik, 1993) . (Council Secretariat, 1995) . Table 3 .
As measured by these more &dquo;conventional&dquo; indices of a priori voting power, the relative leverage of countries has decreased with the overall increase in the number of members. In the first constellation of Community membership, the largest members each held almost one-fourth of total voting power (measured by either index). By contrast, in the present situation, their share is only 11.7 Hence, the collective weight of the individual players in a coalition has to equal or exceed the required decision quota (q).
The total number of coalitions (combinations) that can be formed out of n members is 2&dquo;. For instance, in the framework of a three-member voting body, eight coalitions are possible in practice. With the players labeled A, B, and C respectively, the following coalitions can form: {~}, fBI, {C}, fA, B}, fA, Cl, fB, Cl, the &dquo;grand coalition&dquo; {~4, B, C} and the empty set f 4)1. Depending on the relevant decision rule, however, only some of them are winning.29 Without the empty set, the total of possible coalitions is 2&dquo; -1.
For instance, under the unanimity requirement, only the coalition that encompasses all members, the &dquo;grand coalition,&dquo; {A, B, Cl, is winning.3° In the framework of the simple majority rule-here corresponding with the two-thirds majority requirement-the coalitions ~A, .6}, {A, Cl, fB, C} and ~A,B,C~ are winning.3' In the first example, without counting the empty set, the share of winning coalitions in the total is one in seven, resulting in a figure on the committee's relative &dquo;capacity to act&dquo; of 14.29 percent. In the second case, four out of seven coalitions are winning, generating a figure on the capacity to act of 57.14 percent, indicating a lower barrier to reaching decisions and thus a lower &dquo;status quo bias.&dquo;
The proportion of winning coalitions can be calculated for any voting body and any number of members.32 Note that this procedure not only includes minimum winning coalitions (MWCS), but also takes &dquo;oversized coalitions&dquo; into account.33
The EU presently encompasses fifteen member states. As Table 2 
